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THE PRESENT STATUS OF "ILLUSORY" TRusTs-THE DocTRINE
ON NEWMAN v. DoRE BROUGHT DowN TO DATE1-It has long been
the policy of the law to provide for a widow by setting aside some portion of her deceased husband's estate for her future support. Such a
policy, it has been said, dates back to the laws of Hammurabi and later
evidences of it may. be found in the Justinian Code of the Roman
Law, and in English law from the earliest times; its final manifestation
being in the well-known common law dower.2 It is not with dower,
however, that we are here concerned, for that institution is sufficiently
well understood to require no discussion in this comment.8
While dower still exists in many states in this country, a great
majority have by statute provided that the surviving spouse may take
a certain distributive share of the deceased's estate in lieu of dower
or courtesy,4 and as a general rule, the wife cannot be deprived of this
statutory share by will, since the statutes specifically permit her to
take against the will. 5 However, with few exceptions,° legislatures
have not seen fit to protect this distributive share from inter vivos
transfers, due partly, it would seem, to an unwillingness to interfere
with the free alienation of property, and partly to the belief that a
man's hesitancy to impoverish himself during his lifetime will overcome any desire he might have to impoverish his widow after his
death.
The result has been the adoption of various devices by husbands>
and sometimes by wives, to convey, at least nominally, the title to their
1
It is not the purpose of this comment to try to cover the entire field of thelaw protecting the widow's distributive share from inter vivos gifts and trusts. We shall
confine ourselves rather strictly to the recent cases involving the doctrine of "illusory'"
trusts as set out in Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. (2d) 966 (1937). For
a more complete treatment of the general subject see: 64 A.L.R. 466 (1930); 112.
A.L.R. 643 (1938); ScoTT, TRUSTS, §§ 58.5, 57.5 (1939).
2
See Cahn, "Restraints on Disinheritance," 85 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 139 (1936).
8
"Dower is the estate to which a widow is entitled, at common law, for the
period of her life, in one-third, of the lands and tenements of which her husband was
seized in fee or fee tail, and which her issue, if any, might inherit." TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY, § 178, p. 417 (1903). For other types of dower that have not survived
see footnote on same page.
For a discussion of the restrictions imposed by dower on the alienability of land
see: WALSH, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, 2d ed. (1927); 12 ST. JoHNS L. REv. 355
(1938).
4
3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws, §§188, 189 (1935). Cahn, "Restraints
on Disinheritance," 85 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 139 at 141 (1936).
5
64 A.L.R. 466 (1930); Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 281 (1868).
6
Tenn. Code (Michie, 1938) § 8365; Report of the Commission of Revision of
the Laws of North Carolina Relati,ng to Estates 34-37 (1936).
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property before any vested or contingent right in said property accrues

in the spouse. Dower can be defeated by a bona fide conveyance before
marriage, since seizin or title during coverture is one of the. essentials
of _dower, 7 and as just stated, a man may freely dispose of all his personal prnperty by an absolute transfer inter vivas even after marriage.8
The. courts have been very watchful, however, to see that such
·transfers are made in good faith. The doctrine of "fraud on the marital
right" developed early. The rule is usually stated that if a man conveys his real property on the eve of marriage with the intent of depriving his wife of dower therein, she is entitled to dower as if the
deed· had not been made.11 While the rule is usually stated in terms
of intent, it is probable that it has its roots in genuine fraud; that is,
part of the inducement by which a man acquires a wife is her belief
that she will share in the property of which he is ostensibly siezed, at
his death; if a conveyance of this property is made on the eve of the
marriage she is misled, and to her detriment.10 The rule was originally
applied only to attempts to defeat dower, but the recent cases would
indicate that it applies also to transfers of personal property where
there has been an express or implied representation prior to marriage
that the husban!=l had property, sufficient for the proper support and
maintenance of the wife, in which she would be entitled to a share
on his death.11
It has been further applied where the decedent, in order to effect
a reconciliation with his estranged wife, promised tq make certain provisions for her support.12 In all of these situations we have the elements.
of actual fraud.

II
The more troublesome problems arise in those cases in which the
transfer involved does not satisfy the legal concept of fraud, those
cases in which the courts try to protect the widow's distributive share
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 189, p. 443 (1903).
64 A.L.R. 466 (1930); 112 A.L.R. 649 (1938); Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa.
149 (1891).
'
9 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 189, p. 443 (1903), and cases cited; 2 BIGLOW,
FRAUD 147 (1890).
,
10 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 177 Misc. 1050, 32 N.Y.S. (2d) 839 (1942), repealed
on facts in 265 App. Div. 27, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 612 (1942); LeStrange v. LeStrange,
242 App. Div. 74,-273 N.Y.S. 21 (1933); Rubin v. Myrup Realty Co., Inc., 244
App. Div. 541, 279 N.Y.S. 867 (1934); Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 286
N.Y.S. 814 (1935).
11 Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W. (2d) 509 (1940), and the cases
cited in note ro; Clavin v. Clavin, (N.Y. Co. S.Ct. 1943) 41 N.Y.S. (2d) 377.
12 Weisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 Misc. 487, 7 N.Y.S. (2d) 565
(1938) affirmed in 256 App. Div. 914, !O N.Y.S. (2d) 414 (1939).
7

8
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from devices by which the husband attempts to keep for himself the
benefit of his property during his lifetime and at the same time deprive
his widow of her interest at his death. In this field, the law is more
hazy and the decisions less clear cut. For the purpose of classification
and more careful analysis we shall treat these cases -as falling into two
groups; those which are avoided on the ground stated in Newman v.
Dore, that they are "illusory"; and those avoided on various grounds
involving an improper intent, such as, that they are "colorable,"
"fraudulent," or "testamentary." 18
It is not our purpose to deal extensively with "colorable" transfers
but it is necessary to attempt a classification of them, even though it
may be more or less arbitrary, to differentiate them from "illusory"
transfers. The term "colorable," as used herein, indicates a transfer
which may be absolute on its face, but which, actually, is not a transfer
at all because, through some secret or tacit understanding, the parties
intended that ownership is to be retained by the donor.14 Such a transfer might not even be enforcible between the donor and donee if all
the evidence of the transaction .were adrnitted.15 We might also, for
want of a better place to put them, include within this grouping those
cases in which the courts seem to find fraud in inter vivos transfers
after marriage by analogy to "fraud on the marital right." Resting
their decisions on intent to defeat the widow's interest,16 and in some
cases on public policy, they have allowed the widow to reach property
given absolutely in the lifetime of the husband.11 Within this group
18
"Fraud, says the majority, is to .attempt destruction of the widow's share by a
colorable (as distinguished from a real) transfer. To pretend to alienate property,
while retaining all indicia of ownership and control; to go through the motions and
forms of conveyance when no genuine shifting of economic benefit is intended: these
are fraud. In other words, although the courts do not say as much, they will not set
aside fraudulent transfers; they merely disregard shams and pretenses." Cahn, "Restraints on Disinheritance," 85 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 139 at 151 (1936).
14
As in Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 4n, 138 S.W. (2d) 509 (1940) where
the husband deposited all his money in the name of his sister and the sister drew
checks at his order. Also see Blevins v. Pittman, 189 Ga. 789, 7 S.E. (2d) 662 (1940),
where husband conveyed land to aunt. The aunt in return gave him the use of the
land for life and devised the land to him by a will in which she prohibited alienation
to the wife.
15
Kerwin v. Donaghy, (Mass. 1945) 59 N.E. (2d) 299.
16
Harrison v. Harrison, 198 Ark. 64, 127 S.W. (2d) 270 (1939) citing l
PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 6th ed., § 213 (1911), and 2 B1sHoP, LAw OF
MARRIED WoMEN, § 350 (1875). Bodner v. Feit, 24 App. Div. II9, 286 N.Y.S.
814 (1936).
17
ln Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. n50 at II62, 130
S.W. (2d) 6n (1939), after stating that the public policy of the state had long been
to protect the widow's share in the property of her deceased husba!ild, said: "We
are unwilling to repeal by implication the ~tatutes of this State and to say that a hus-
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also are cases in which an attempt to set up an inter vivos trust has
been held to be testamentary. 18

III
The foregoing discussion is in no respect complete, and is included
merely as a background for a study of the doctrine of "illusory" transfers as set out in Newman v. Dore. 19 In that case the settlor, a few
days before his death, had conveyed substantially all his property to
a trustee, but he had retained not only the income for life and the
power to revoke, but also the right to control the trustee in the management of the trust. The court specifically rejected all theories of intent
and fraud,2° and held that the only sound test was whether the husband
had in good faith divested himself of ownership of his property or
had made an illusory transfer. 21 While the court did not decide that
the transaction was not testamentary, it carefully avoided placing its
decision on that ground.
In view of the rather substantial body of authority in New York
and elsewhere in which N eW1nan v. Dore is cited, and apparently followed, it is worthwhile to inquire what is meant by an illusory transfer;
and in what situations the rule of N eW1nan v. Dore has been applied;
and how widely the rule has been accepted, modified or rejected by
the courts in subsequent cases.
Evidently the court did not mean "colorable" when it used the
term "illusory." Nor did it mean to include any element of bad motive
or intent to defra'tld the wife; though it would seem that it was unhand may by means of a fraudulent conveyance evade the express terms of the statute
and that a court of equity is powerless in the premises." See also Martin v. Martin,
282 Ky. 4u, 138 S.W. (2d) 509 (1940).
18
President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174,
21 N.Y.S. (2d) 232 (1940); Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., -344 Mo.
u50, 130 S.W. (2d) 6II (1939); Cochran's Admx. v. Cochran, 273 Ky. 1, 115
S.W. (2d) 376 (1937); Central Trust Co. v. Watt, 139 Ohio 50, 38 N.E. (2d)
185 (1942), 41 MrcH. L. REv. 191 (1942); cf. TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 57 (2)
(1935).
19
275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. (2d) 966 (1937).
20
The court said, id. at -3 79, "Intent may, at times, be relevant in determining
whether an act is fraudulent, but there can be no fraud where no right of any person is
invaded.... the law gives the wife only an expectant interest in the property of her
husband which becomes part of his estate .•.• " The court cited Leonard v. Leonard,
181 Mass. 458, 63 N.E. 1068 (1902).·
21
The court quoted with approval from Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust- Co.,
269 Pa. St. 257 at 259, 112 A. 62 (1920) as follows: "The 'good faith' required
of the donor or settler in making a valid disposition of his property during life does
not refer to the purpose to affect his wife but to the intent to di,,est himself of the
ownership of the property. It is, therefore, apparent that the fraudulent intent which
will defeat a gift inter vivos cannot be predicated on the husband's intent to deprive
the wife of her distributive share of his estate as widow."
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fortunate to include the phrase "in good faith" in its explanation of
the term. The test which the court was laying down, at least if we are
to interpret it in the light of subsequent New York decisions, was this:
Did the decedent, by the conveyance in his lifetime, retain such a large
interest in the property that, at least as to the wife, his inter vivos
transfer was illusory? Or to use the phrase of Mr. Justice Holmes,
quoted by the court from Leonard v. Leonard,22 can we say that "from
the technical point of view such a conveyance does not take back all
that it gives, but practically it does"?
The first question that naturally presents itself is just how much
control retained in the settlor is necessary to make the transfer illusory?
Newman v. Dore clearly implies that a conveyance absolute on its face
is effectual to defeat the widow's interest, and it has been so held in
subsequent cases.23 It seems evident that-courts will not declare a transfer illusory where the donor retains only the income, or the beneficial
use. 24 In Newman v. Dore the court specifically refused to decide
whether the retention of income plus the power to revoke would make
the trust illusory, and the authority of one recent case would indicate
that such retention would not be fatal. 25 It is interesting to note, however, that there has been a recommendation made in one state for
legislation which would make such a trust void; u and such a trust
22

181 Mass. 458 at 461, 63 N.E. 1068 (1902).
In re Wrone's Estate, 177 Misc. 541, 31 N.Y.S. (2d) 191 (1941) cites the
rule but holds that where the decedent, in normal health, by a gift of his stock in a
corporation stripped himself of all dominion and control, he thereby divested himself
of title and ownership and the transfer was not illusory. See also, Spafford v. Pfeffer,
179 Misc. 867, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 831 (1943); Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32
N.E. (2d) 779 (1941).
24
See Maruska v. Equitable Life Assurance Co. of United States, (D.C. Minn.
1938) 21 F. Supp. 841 (decided prior to Newman v. Dore), in which it was held
that a husband might use all of his personal property to purchase an annuity for himself, even though it was alleged by the wife to hav_e been done to prevent any claim
she might have arising from a threatened divorce action.
See also Haskell v. Art Institute of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N.E. (2d)
736 (1940), where decedent made a gift of pictures by formal deed, and the pictures
were "leased" back to him for life, held, good transfer, citing Newman v. Dore;
KERR, FRAUD AND MISTAKE 220 (1877); Padfield v. Padfield, 78 Ill, 16 (1875).
25
Kerwin v. Donaghy, (Mass. 1945) 59 N.E. (2d) 299, in which the trust
instrument renounced on its face any interest in the property aside from a life income
and a power to revoke. The court reserved opinion on whether Newman v. Dore
would have been followed if the circumstances had been the same.
u REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF REVISION OF THE LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA
RELATING TO ESTATES 34-37 (1936), which reads in part:
"I. Any gratuitous transfer of property, real or personal, shall be deemed to be
in fraud of a wife, unless she join therein or assent thereto in writing if:
"1. the husband retains the power to revoke it during his lifetime, whether
exerciseable by him alone or in conjunction with any person not having a substantial
adverse interest."
23
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is void as to the donor's creditors.21 In a majority of the cases in which,
the terms of the trust were similar to those of the trust in Newman v.
Dore, i.e., where there is in the grantor the retention of income, the
power to revoke and an element of control of management, the rule of
that casehas been recognized. 28 Some courts have followed the rule
almost without variation; 29 one has specifically rejected it in favor of a
public policy rule against a~ intent to defeat the wife's interest.80 One
has given it a different interpretation and reached the opposite conclusion on essentially the same set of facts; 81 and in one case, the court,
making no mentiqn of Newman v. Dore, held to the contrary on similar
fa~?
I
The second question considered is, in which situations will the
principle of illusory transfer apply. From the cases, it would seem that
it has not been confined tQ trusts in their usual form but has been
applied as well to analogous situations. Thus it has been argued that
where a decedent in his lifetime made deposits of his own money in a
joint savings account, opened by himself but in the name of himself
and another, he was in effect making a conveyance of his property over
which he retained control during his lifetime, but which passed to the
survivor at his death. The New York cases ss have refused to apply the
illusory doctrine 'to this type of conveyance, holding that the situation
27

TRUSTS RESTATEMENT,§ 156 (c) (1935); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,§ 328
(1940).
28
President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290, 14
N.Y.S. (2d) 375 (1939), but decided on different grounds on appeal; Burns v.
Turnbull, (Nassau Co. S.Ct. 1942) 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 380; Smith v. Northern Trust
Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E. (2d) 75 (1944); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.,
(Ohio 1944) 58 N.E. (2d) 381; Merz v.'Tower Grpve Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo.
u50, 130 S.W. (2d) 6u (1939).
29
President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290, 14
N.Y.S. (2d) 375 (1939); Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.
(2d) 75 (1944); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio 195, 58 N.E. (2d) 381
(1944).
so Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. u50, 130 S.W. (2d)
6II (1939).
81
Burns v. Turnbull, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) ·380 (1942). In this case the court in~
terprets the rule as requiring bad faith on the part of the settlor. This is a lower court
(Supreme Court) case and· seems to be completely out of line with the other New
York decisions of both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.
82
Rose v. Rose, 300 Mich. 73, l N.W. (2d) 458 (1942). The settlor in this
case retained and exercised more control than in Newman v. Dore, but the court,
after stating that conveyances prior to marriage are not fraudulent per se in Michigan,
held that the widow had been provided for in other ways, and that therefore there
was no fraud in the transfers.
88
In re Lorch's Estate, (Queen's Co. Surr. Ct. 1941) 33 N.Y.S. (2d) 157;
Inda v. Inda, 288 N.Y. 315, 43 N.E. (2d) 59 (1942), see also note in 52 YALE L.J.
656 (1942). And see In re Kalina's Will, 184 Misc. 367, 53 N.Y.S. (2d) 775
(1945), involving United States' bonds.
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is controlled by the New York Banking Law.84 The Massachusetts
court 'arrives at the same general conclusion without benefit of any
statute, holding that the reservation by the depositor of a right to
. withdraw both income and principal and to revoke the entire transaction was not inconsistent with a perfected creation, inter vivos, of a
joint tenancy in the account.85 However, certificates of deposit payable
to the order of the depositor or another or the survivor of them, but
retained by the depositor in his possession, have been held invalid as
to the widow's distributive share.86 The position of the courts on joint
bank accounts may be in part explained by the contention of eminent
authority that such accounts cannot be considered trusts at all but only
contracts.87 Savings bank trusts, called Totten Trusts in the New York
cases,88 have received treatment distinctly different from that accorded
to joint bank accounts. The courts have uniformly held that the exceptional nature of trusts in bank deposits does not imply that they are
on a different footing from other inter vivos transfers where husband
and wife are concerned. 39 The only variance in the cases seems to be
that the two give unqualified support to the Newman v. Dore doctrine,40 while the others seem to modify the doctrine slightly.41 A more
complete discussion of the variance will be given in a later paragraph.
84
N.Y. Laws (1914) c. 369, § 249 (3), providing that a deposit in the prescribed form creates a joint tenancy in the account during the joint lives of the depositors.
35
Malone v. Walsh, (Mass. 1944) 53 N.E. (2d) 126.
86
Hamilton v. First State Bank, 254 Ill. App. 55 (1929). But an absolute gift
of certificates of deposit, duly certified, has been held to be good as against the widow's
interest. Norris v. Bradshaw, 96 Colo. 594, 43 P. (2d) 638 (1935).
87
Scorr, TRUSTS, § 58.6 (3) (1939), stating: "What he [the depositor] is
doing is paying consideration to the bank for its promise made to him and the other."
38
See Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112 at 125, 71 N.E. 748 (1904) in which
the court held: "A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own name as trustee
for another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime
of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies
or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration...." For
discussion see, I Scorr, TRUSTS, §§ 58.2, 58.3 (1939); Larrimore, "Judicial Legislation in New York," 14 YALE L. J. 312 at 315 (1905).
39
Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E. (2d) 779 (1941); Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 258 App. Div. 132, 15 N.Y.S. (2d) 915 (1939); Schnakenberg v.
Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 841 (1941); Mushaw v. Mushaw
(Md. 1944) 39 A. (2d) 465.
40
Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E. (2d) 779 (1941); Schnakenberg v.
Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 841 (1941); Mushaw Mushaw,
41
In Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 258 App. Div. 132, 15 N.Y.S. (2d)
915 (1939), the court seems to limit the Newman doctrine to cases in which the
widow elects to take against the will under the provisions of New York Decedent
Estate Law (McKinney, 1939) § 18.
In Mushaw v. Mushaw, (Md. 1944) 39 A. (2d) 465, there is some indication
that the court considers an "illusory" transfer only evidence of fraud.

v.
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One lower court has held that the Newman v. Dore rule, having been
applied to Totten Trusts, undoubtedly applies to life insurance policies
where the insured reserves the right during his lifetime to change the
beneficiaries. But this decision was overruled by the upper court, and
the general rule would seem to be that there is nothing illusory in
making a person a beneficiary of a life insurance policy and yet reserving the power to change the benefi~iary.42 The same rule has been
applied to a life insurance trust. 43
The primary principle that a husband may divest himself completely of his estate by means of absolute transfers inter vivos 44 would
logically indicate that the position of the wife in protecting her distributive share is not that of a creditor, and the cases seem to bear that
out.45 Where, however, the wife has a claim against the estate of her
husband arising from sources other than her statutory share, such as
alimony or claims for maintenance, she is deemed to be a creditor.46
Before drawing- our conclusions it might be well to direct our attention to certain other items that may have some influence on the
decisions, and might be considered as qualifiying the general doctrine
slightly. The first of these is that in most of the cases some com42 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 177 Misc. 1050, 32 N.Y.S. (2d) 839 (1941), reversed ~n 265 App. Div. 27, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 61'2 (1942).
43
Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 177 Md. 271, 9 A. (2d)
5 8 I ( I 93 9). The court, after discussing the retention of control in the trust, said,
"By these reservations Mr. Bullen had no other or additional authority, that he did
not possess before he created the trust. These are all powers incident to policies of life
insurance and such provisions or reservations do not confer upon the wife or widow
any other or additional rights, privileges, or estate, that were not hers before the trust
was created."
44 See 64 A.L.R. 466 ( I 930), and cases previously cited.
45
See Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E. (2d) 779 (1941) where the
court said, "Rules having to do with voluntary conveyances as fraud upon creditors
have no bearing in this connection." See also In re Wrone's Estate, I 77 Misc. 541, 3'1
N.Y.S. (2d) 191 (1941); Haskell v. Art Institute of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 393,
26 N.E. (2d) 736 ( I 940). But see from the same state as the last case cited, Hamilton
v. First State Bank of Willow Hill, 254 Ill. App. 55 (1929), in which the court
states, "A husband cannot, by a voluntary conveyance without his wife's consent,
deprive her of her right to the widow's award, which is a debt against his estate, and she is a creditor to the amount of her award." For other cases see IO WORDS AND
PHRASES 419.
46 Kuhlbarsch v. Sauter, 170 Misc. 955, IO N.Y.S. (2d) 997 (1939); Maruska
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, (D.C. Minn. 1938) 21 F. Supp. 841.
See also cases collected in IO WoRDS AND PHRASES 419. It is interesting to note that
as to claims of such nature, the wife stands in a position superior to that of an ordinary
creditor in certain situations. Her claims may be satisfied out of funds received as
awards under the Workmen's Compensation Law, Commons v. Bragg, (Okla. 1938)
80 P. (2d) 287, 290, 291, or the World War Veterans' Act, Hollis v. Bryan, 166
Miss. 874, 143 S. 687 (1932), even though these awards are exempt from claims of
ordinary creditors.
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parison has been made between the size of the decedent's estate, or
former estate before reduction by gift, and the amount left to the
widow by will, gift, or decent. 47 The second is that the length of time
between the making o'f the transfer and the death of the decedent has
been mentioned at least in a substantial number of the cases as a significant factor. 48

IV
To draw some conclusions from our study it would seem first, that
substantially all of the recent cases cite Newman v. Dore and at least
consider the doctrine it sets forth. 49 A great majority of these follow it
in general principle; 50 some give it a modified application. In Mushaw
47

In re Newman v. Dore, decedent had transferred substantially all his property
to the trust; in Rose v. Rose, 300 Mich. 73, I N.W. (2d) 458 (1942), he had transferred a large part of his property to his wife inter vivos; in Bullen v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. of Baltimore, 177 Md. 271, 9 A. (2d) 581 (1939), he had given his
wife inter vivos and at his death property worth more than $150,000; in Cochran's
Admx. v. Cochran, 273 Ky. 1, l 15 S.W. (2d) 376 (1937), inter vivos gifts of more
than $100,000 were given to the children, property of negligible value to the wife;
Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. u50, 130 S.W. (2d) 6II (1939)
trust of $330,000, $200 per month to widow; Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill.
App. 168, 54 N.E. (2d) 75 (1944) trust constituted all of estate except a pension;
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 265 App. Div. 27, 37 N.E. (2d) 612 (1942); Mushaw v.
Mushaw, (Md. 1944) 39 A. (2d) 465.
48
Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. (2d) 966 (1937); Merz v. Tower
Grove Bank and Trust Co., 344 Mo. u50, 130 S.W. (2d) 6II (1939); Cochran's
Admx. v. Cochran, 273 Ky. 1,115 S.W. (2d) 376 (1937); Haskell v. Art Institute
of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N.E. (2d) 736 (1940); Martin v. Martin, 282
Ky. 4u, 138 S.W. (2d) 509 (1940); Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322.111. App.
168, 54 N.E. (2d) 75 (1944).
49
Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E. (2d) 779 (1941); Inda v. Inda,
288 N.Y. 315, 43 N.E. (2d) 59 (1942); In re Wrone's Estate, 177 Misc. 541, 31
N.Y.S. (2d) 191 (1941); In re Lorch's Estate, 33 N.Y.S. (2d) 157 (1941); Spafford v. Pfeffer, 179 Misc. 867, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 831 (1943); Mitchell v. Mitchell,
265 App. Div. 27, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 612 (1942); Clavin v. Clavin, 267 App. Div.
760, 41 N.Y.S. (2d) 377 (1943); Burns v. Turnbull, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 380 (1942);
President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290, 14 N.Y.S.
(2d) 375 (1939), on appeal 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 232 (1940);
Hochster v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 260 App. Div. 712, 24 N.Y.S. (2d) IIO
(1940); Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 258 App. Div. 132, 15 N.Y.S. (2d)
915 (1939); Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S. (2d)
841 (1941); Merz v. Tower Grove Bank and Trust Co., 344 Mo. u50, 130 S.W.
(2d) 611 (1939); Mushaw v. Mushaw, (Md. 1944) 39 A. (2d) 465; Smith v.
Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E. (2d) 75 (1944); Bolles v. Toledo
Trust Co., 144 Ohio 195, 58 N.E. (2d) 381 (1944); Kerwin v. Donaghy, (Mass.
1945) 59 N.E. (2d) 299; Haskell v. Art Institute of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 393, 26
N.E. (2d) 736 (1940).
5
°Krause Y. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E. (2d) 779 (1941); Inda v. Inda,
288 N.Y. 315, 43 N.E. (2d) 59 (1942); In re Wrone's Estate, 177 Misc. 541,
31 N.Y.S. (2d) 191 (1941); In re Lorch's Estate, 33 N.Y.S. (2d) 157 (1941);
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v. Mushaw, 51 while the court cites the rule with approval, the general
tenor of the case would indicate that it does not consider the rule conclusive in itself, but only evidence of fraud. It is interesting to note
that the court distinguishes the instant case fro•m a former Maryland
case, 52 rather largely on the basis of whef;;her the widow was left well
provided for by other means or was left destitute by the transfer. In
Burns v. Turnbull, 53 it is held that no.t only must the transfer be
illusory, but it must also be in bad faith. This is a lower court case,
however, and it would seem to be completely out of line with the
~ecisions of the New Yark Court of Appeals and the App elate Divis10n.
Some courts attempt to limit the scope of its appli~tion. In Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank,5¾ the court held that the rule applies
only where the widow ,elects to take against the will under the provisions of the Decedent Estates Law, section I 8, and does not apply
in cases of intestacy, but in Schnackenberg v. Schnackenberg,5 5 another
division of the court refused to follow and sharply criticized the
opinion. 56
Others consider the rule, and reject it in favor of a rule concerned
,with fraud or public policy,5 1 and still others make no mention of either
the case or the principle. 58 It would seem that some carry-over from
"fraud on the marital right" is still in the minds of the courts in spite
Spafford v. Pfeffer, 179 Misc. 867, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 831 (1943); Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 265 App. Div. 27, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 612 (1942); Clavin v. Clavin, 267
App. Div. 760, 41 N.Y.S. (2d) 377 (1943); Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc.
290, 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 375 (1939), on appeal, 260 App. Di~. 174, 21 N.Y.S. (2d)
232 (1940); Hochster v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 260 App Div. 712, 24 N.Y.S.
(2d) IIo (1940); Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S.
(2d) 841 (1941); Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E. (2d) ,
75 (1944); Bollesv. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio 195, 58 N.E. (2d) 381 (1944).
~l (Md. 1944) 39 A. (2d) 465.
52
Sturgis v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Pocomoke City, 152 Md. 654, 137 A. 378
(1927).
.
58
Burns v. Turnbull, (Nassau Co. S.Ct. 1942) 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 380.
54
258 App. Div. 132, 15 N.Y.S. (2d) 915 (1939).
55
260 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 841 (1941).
56
See also Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E. (2d) 75
(1944); Spafford v. Pfeffer, 179 Misc. 867, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 831 (1943), and Clavin
v. Clavin, 267 App. Div. 760, 41 N.Y.S. (2d) 377 (1943), all cases in which the
rule was applied to intestacy. See also Kerwin v. Donaghy, (Mass. 1945) 59 N.E. (2d)
299 where the court says, "The right of a wife as distributee stands no higher than
the similar, right of a child."
•
57
Merz v: Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. II50, 130 S.W. (2d)
6II (1939). In its final analysis, however, the court seems to hold that the trust was
testamentary.
58
Rose v. Rose, 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W. (2d) 458 (1942); Martin v. Martin,
282 Ky. 4II, 138 s.w. (2d) 509 (1940).
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of the cases that have clearly pointed out that there can be no fraud
unless some right is invaded by misrepresentation.59
Others, while adopting the doctrine of illusory transfer, consider
it only evidence of fraud. 60 Even in the cases that embrace the illusory
doctrine completely do we find mention made of the percentage of
the decedent's property conveyed 61 and the length of time elapsing
between the transfer and the decedent's death. 02 This would appear to
be inconsistent, for it is hard to see how either of these items would
contribute to the determination of whether a transfer is absolute or
illusory. Their consideration can be explained in part by the need
for determining, in the case of the amount, whether the distributive
share was adequately provided for in the will even if the transfer was
set aside, and, in the case of the time, whether the transfer might be
a gift causa mortis, but the frequency of the appearance of these items
may indicate that, subconsciously, the judges still have a vestigial concept of fraud deep in their minds.
While the general theory of illusory transfers has been widely
accepted, its application is still difficult and not always uniform. Where
the gift or transfer has been made in a somewhat standardized form,
such as in the case of joint savings accounts, "Totten Trusts," and
life insurance policies, we can predict the application of the theory with
reasonable accuracy,68 at least after one decision has been handed· down
in a particular state, because all such transactions follow the same
general pattern.
The real difficulty comes in the application of the principle to
trusts of the common type, because each trust is different, and a different amount of control may be retained in each. In an earlier paragraph we reviewed the decisions pertaining to retention of incoII,1e,
power to revoke, and control of the trustee, but there is some indication that in some states .even the presence of all three may not' be conclusive.64 It also seems quite evident that the courts do not sharply
59
Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. (2d) 966 (1937); Leonard v.
Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N.E. 1068 (1902); Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co.,
269 Pa. St. 257 (1927). ·
'
60 Mushaw v. Mushaw, (Md. 1944) 39 A. (2d) 465.
61
See note 47, supra.
62
See note 48, supra.
68
See notes 33 to 43, supra.
6
" In Newman v. Dore the court quotes with approval from Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 269 Pa. 257 at 259, II2 A. 62 (1920), in supporting the illusory
doctrine, but immediately follows the quotation with citations of other Pennsylvania
cases (Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. St. 149, 21 A. 809 (1891); Beirne v. ContinentalEquitable Title & Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 A. 7~1 (1932) sustaining trusts in
which a life income, power to revoke and substantial control had been retained by
his settlor. Also see Kerwin v. Donaghy, (Mass. 1945) 59 N.E. (2d) 299; and
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differentiate between the terms "colorable" and "illusory" to the extent indicated in the, definition given earlier in this discussion.65
Whether a transfer is ''illusory" because on its face it takes back almost
all it gives, or absolute on its face and "colored" by a secret or tacit
Ul].derstanding, underlying each is the intent on the part of the settlor
to retain ownership in the property. The distinction between the two
classifications then becomes a matter of evidence.63
What have we then which we can call a basic principle that will
give coordination to our thinking and lend a degree of harmony to the
decisions? Only the bare fundamental principle of Newman v. Dore
that the· test is whether the settlor intended to divest himself of his
property or whether he intended only to cover up the fact that he was
retaining full control.
You may feel that this conclusion merely brings us back to our
starting point; but we must keep in mind that the intent by which we
test the transfers is not the "intent to defraud" of the earlier decisions,
but an intent to retain,. or part with, the ownership of the property
in question. If arriving at the end of our discussion with a rule of
intent seems somewhat disappointing, we must . remember that we
have not only a rule of intent, but a rule of intent-with guide posts.
Edward A. S111,ith*
Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E. (2d) 113 (1944), in which the court
reserved .opinion as to whether such a trust would be sustained, but seemed to lean
strongly toward the Pennsylvania cases cited. Recent Pennsylvania cases cite the Bierne
case but none have decided the exact problem. See DeNoble v. DeNoble, 331 Pa. 273,
200 A. 77, (1938); and Kirk v. Kirk, 340 Pa. St. 203, 16 A. (2d) 47 (1940).
65
See Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E. (2d) 75 (1944)
which cites with both Newman v. Dore, and Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 4II, 138
S.W. ( 2d) 509 ( 1940) as supporting the doctrine of illusory transfers. In Martin v.
Martin the transfer was absolute, but could be supported under our "colorable" classification. See also Kerwin v. Donaghy, (Mass. 1945) 59 -N.E. (2d) 299 which seems
to make no such distinction, and it seems probable that the Pennsylvania cases have in
mind any type of transfer which is sham.
66
See Kerwin v. Donaghy, (Mass. 1945) 59 N.E. (2d) 299 which considers the
effect of the "parol evidence rule" in determining what testimony is allowable to show
that a transfer by deed was in fact "illusory."
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